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Abstract 
This paper aims to understand the change in corporate tax avoidance following a M&A 
deal. Several M&A features were tested in a sample which covers 707 European deals. 
Overall, results suggest that there is no statistical evidence of changes in corporate tax 
avoidance following M&A deals. However, we found some evidence of higher level of 
corporate tax avoidance when the deal is horizontal and when the target company had 
operating losses the year before deal. Our results suggest a decrease in ETR of about 3% 
for horizontal mergers and a reduction of effective taxes paid between 6.2% and 8.6% if 
target had negative pre-tax income pre-deal. This reduction in ETR increases to 9% for 
horizontal deals, in which the target had a negative pre-tax income one-year before the 
deal. Our findings support the view that tax motives may not trigger M&A deals, although 
significant tax savings appear to occur for certain M&A characteristics. 
 
JEL: G34; H26; F20 
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Resumo 
Este trabalho tem como objetivo perceber as alterações ao planeamento fiscal da empresa 
após uma operação de F&A. Várias características de F&A foram testadas numa amostra 
que abrange 707 operações Europeias. No geral, os resultados sugerem que não há 
evidência estatística de alterações no planeamento fiscal da empresa adquirente após uma 
operação de F&A. No entanto, encontrámos evidência de um maior nível de planeamento 
fiscal quando as operações são horizontais e quando a empresa-alvo tem resultados 
operacionais negativos no ano anterior à operação. Os nossos resultados sugerem uma 
diminuição de cerca de 3% na taxa efetiva de imposto quando a operação é horizontal e 
uma redução dos impostos pagos, entre 6.2% e 8.6%, se a empresa-alvo apresentou 
resultados operacionais negativos no ano anterior à operação. Esta redução na taxa efetiva 
de imposto aumenta para 9% se a operação for simultaneamente horizontal e a empresa-
alvo tenha resultados operacionais negativos no ano anterior à operação. Os nossos 
resultados suportam a perspetiva de que motivos fiscais podem não despoletar uma 
operação de F&A, no entanto uma significativa poupança fiscal parece verificar-se para 
determinadas características das F&As.  
 
JEL: G34; H26; F20 
Palavras-chave: Fusões e Aquisições; Evasão fiscal; Transfronteiriço 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last years, mergers and acquisitions have increased significantly both in value 
and number of transactions, increasing its importance as form of business investment. 
According to Thomson Reuters M&A Review (2015), in 2015 was announced $4,7 
trillion in worldwide M&A operations, more 40% than in 2014, being set as the biggest 
M&A year ever, until then, beating the previous record of $4,4 trillion in 2007. Another 
interesting fact in 2015, was the significant number of mega-deals (more than $5 billion) 
in 2015. The 137 mega-deals planned last year, represented 52% of total M&A value in 
2015. Over the last decades M&A activity has been represented by several waves. Knox 
and Harik (2015) argued that, 2015 could be the start of a new wave for M&A. The 
authors refer that the increasingly number of deals is related with stock market conditions. 
M&A´s can generate synergetic gains through reduction of doing business costs 
(economies of scale) and consolidation, leading to a greater market share and 
consequently to an increase in revenues (Devos et al., 2008). Besides operational 
synergies, there are also potential tax synergies arising from M&A operations. Prior 
literature argues that tax attributes (e.g. net operating losses) can play an important role 
on M&A activity (See Auberbach and Reishus, 1986;1987;1988; Hayn, 1989), and that 
usually, these attributes are reflected in higher premiums paid by the companies in M&A 
deals (See Kaplan, 1989). Additionally, the literature suggests an increase of tax 
avoidance strategies, especially from multinational firms, which arise mainly from the 
tax rate-gap between countries (See Schwarz, 2009; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; 
Clausing, 2009). Parent companies from high tax juridisctions engage in more tax 
avoidance strategies (via income shifting) with their affiliates, from lower tax 
juridisctions, in order to reduce their tax burden (See Klassen and Laplante, 2012; 
Clausing, 2003). Some studies have presented tax avoidance motives as a driver for 
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M&A, especially for cross-border deals (Belz et al., 2013; Huizinga & Voget, 2009). A 
recent and much criticized case was the announced $160 billion deal between Pfizer and 
Allergan. With the M&A, Pfizer would strategically move its headquarters to Ireland in 
order to reduce its actual corporate tax burden. According to Fortune (2015), the operation 
would reduce (approximately 25%) Pfizer´s current effective tax rate (ETR) to a 
combined effective tax rate of approximately 17% to 18% in the first year after this tax 
inversion deal. Besides all synergies related to the creation of the biggest drug maker 
company, this was a clear tax-motive merger as Ireland has low corporate income tax 
rates1. Another recent announced tax inversion deal, that was effectively concluded, was 
made between the American company Johnson Controls and an Irish company Tyco. As 
US companies are subjected to one of the highest tax rate in the world, cross-border deals 
are increasingly becoming more frequent.  
This study aims to assess whether the level of corporate tax avoidance increase for the 
acquirer company following an M&A deal.  The characteristics that may well shape the 
deal are also analysed. By using several tax avoidance measures, similar to Chen et al. 
(2010) study, we test if there is evidence of lower taxes paid by the acquirer after deal. 
Belz et al. (2013) found a decrease of target´s ETR by 3% following M&A deal, however, 
the authors have only documented this result graphically.  
We use data from Thomson Reuters Eikon database, which covers 10 years of European 
M&A deals. Our sample comprises 359 completed M&A deals from 34 different 
European countries, which were announced between 2005 and 2014. In addition to the 
main aim of this thesis, several hypotheses are added, regarding the type of deal 
(horizontal vs non-horizontal and domestic vs cross-border), existence of operating losses 
                                                          
1 The smaller company, Irish-based Allergan would buy the larger company, American-based Pfizer, 
maintaining the well-known Pfizer brand as the name. 
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by the target and tax rate differences between both acquirer and target company. Overall, 
our findings suggest that there is no evidence of higher level of corporate tax avoidance 
following an M&A. However, this overall result may be shaped by several characteristics. 
Firstly, if both firms operate in the same industry, there is a statistically significant 
evidence of a reduction in acquirer´s book effective tax rate of 3%, following deal. 
Secondly, if the target company presented negative pre-tax income the year before deal, 
we found that acquirer´s tax burden is reduced between 6.2% and 8.6%, depending on the 
tax avoidance measure. This reduction increases by about 9% for book ETR, if the deal 
is horizontal and the target had negative pre-tax income one year before the deal, 
simultaneously. Lastly, ambiguous results were found regarding the deal be domestic 
rather than cross-border. Additional tests were performed to assess the robustness of our 
findings. The rest of the research is structure as following: Section 2 presents previous 
literature regarding M&A tax issues and tax avoidance strategies of multinational firms; 
Section 3 describes the data and the methodology applied; Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results and Section 5 concludes the study. 
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2 Literature Review 
Over the last years, mergers and acquisitions have increased significantly both in value 
and number of transactions, increasing its importance as form of business investment. 
There are several reasons for a company to acquire another company, or for two or more 
companies to merge. The overall reason pointed for a company to acquire other company 
is that the acquiring firm considers the operation profitable in terms of investment 
(Pautler, 2001). Synergy gains, reduction of the costs of doing business, better 
organizational activity, the increase of market power or a better management efficiency 
are other, but not less important reasons for M&As. Ngueyn et al. (2012), by using a 
sample of domestic US acquisitions, found ex-post evidence that M&As were motivated 
by market timing, agency or hubris reasons as a response to economic, and or industry 
shocks. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) have analysed the determinants of the five 
M&A waves and found that are some common reasons for all waves. The authors pointed 
managerial self-interest and hubris as motives for M&A activity. 
With an increased globalization of business and the lack of opportunities in local markets, 
companies had to rapidly adjust to those changes via foreign investment. Cross-border 
M&A represent the largest share of FDI, for developed countries2. It allows firms to 
diversify their production overseas, leading to a higher economic integration among 
countries all over the world (di Giovanni, 2005). Having access to different customers, 
suppliers and capital markets, cross-border deals are an important driver for a greater 
competitiveness in a dynamic economy. There are several determinants for a cross-border 
deal to take place. Erel et al. (2012) found that the geography is relevant for a deal to take 
place, arguing that, it is more likely for a company to acquire another if that company 
                                                          
2 In comparison to greenfield investment, in 1999, cross-border M&A represented 80% of total FDI (See 
Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). 
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operates in a nearby country. The authors also pointed that currency movements between 
countries could increase the likelihood of the acquirer firm being from the country with 
the appreciating currency, while the target was more likely to be from the country with 
the depreciating currency. The authors add that economically developed countries, with 
higher accounting standards and higher stock market performance are more likely to be 
the buyer. Rossi and Volpin (2004) analysed the main differences in laws and 
enforcement between countries and concluded that, besides better accounting standards, 
the volume of M&A in a country is also explained by a stronger shareholder protection. 
The authors also found that higher investor protection the probability of a cross-border 
operation to occur. The authors argue that, usually, target companies are related to 
countries with lower investor protection and acquirers to countries with better investor 
protection, suggesting the importance of cross-border deals as a driver for a global 
convergence in corporate governance standards.3 Manchin (2004) found similar 
conclusions, arguing that target firms can improve corporate governance by adopting 
some “inside rules” of the acquirer, improving its efficiency and investor protection. 
Besides the previously presented determinants of cross-border M&As, there are also 
significant tax factors that might affect the volume of M&As4. 
2.1 Tax issues as determinants of M&A 
There is an extent literature about the impact that taxation can take in M&A operations 
and in multinational companies´ activity in general. The first tax issue is the corporate 
combination form that the transaction can take. A transaction can take the form of a 
taxable or tax-free operation and the choice may have a significant impact on the potential 
corporate tax benefits (Gilson et al., 1988). If the transaction is considered taxable, 
                                                          
3 Similar findings were obtained in Monteiro (2012) study. 
4 The authors also concluded that M&A waves are occur more often in periods of economic recovery 
and crisis, and that are influenced by industrial and technological shocks.  
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shareholders from target company have to pay taxes from the capital gains obtained from 
the sale of target company shares. However, if the transaction is tax-free, target 
shareholders do not have to pay any taxes until they decide to sell the shares received 
from the acquiring company. The second alternative can be beneficial for target 
shareholders of smaller companies, once they can obtain a more balanced and diversified 
portfolio by exchanging their stocks for stocks of a larger and more diversified company5. 
Bierman (1980) presents, in a very simple way, the tax incentive of a company to acquire 
the shares of another firm. The author argues that a company may have a tax advantage 
to acquire the shares of other company initially, if decides to pay dividends6. In the case 
of a cash transaction, target shareholders are immediately taxed due to the gain resultant 
from the deal. Sullivan (1993) found that target shareholders request higher premiums to 
compensate the immediate liability they are subject to after the deal. Erickson (1998) have 
analysed the impact of tax and non-tax characteristics of a target company in the deal´s 
structure. The author found similar conclusions: in taxable transactions the average 
premium demanded is higher than in tax-free transactions. The author adds that the 
probability of non-taxable (stock) transaction taking place, increases with the market-to- 
-book (M/B) ratio of the acquiring company. Similarly, Carleton et al. (1983) found that 
the probability of a cash takeover is a decrease function of dividend pay-out ratios and 
M/B ratios, adding that, a company with low dividend pay-out ratios and M/B ratios is 
more likely to be acquired through a cash takeover rather than through a securities 
exchange. 
                                                          
5 Although this option might be preferable in the perspective of individual taxation, can limit the 
potential corporate tax benefits (See Auberbach & Reishus (1987)). 
6 The amount of dividends paid to the investors will be greater if the acquirer retains its earnings initially 
to buy the shares of the target company, and then pay the dividends arising from target ‘earnings. 
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Besides shareholders´ tax factors, there are also potential tax benefits, at a corporate level, 
that may trigger M&A operations. Firstly, an acquiring company may have unused tax 
credits and tax losses (NOLs) that can be transferred to the target company to offset its 
taxable income, or vice-versa. A company that presents a tax loss or have unused tax 
credits can carryforwards these tax benefits to be used when the company has enough 
taxable income to be reduced (Cooper & Knittel, 2006)7. Secondly, a company might 
step-up asset basis for tax purposes.  Before an acquisition, a company can readjust the 
value of their assets by increasing the tax basis of those assets (Brown & Ryngaert, 1991). 
Increasing the tax basis of the assets lead to higher deductions, which are treated as tax 
expenses, reducing the combined company´s tax liabilities. However, this potential 
benefit can be partially offset by the recapture tax8. Thirdly, companies can increase the 
amount of debt to benefit from the tax deductibility of interest9. Financing operations with 
debt rather than equity may be advantageous from a tax point of view. By financing its 
operations with debt, the merged firm can reduce its tax burden through deductions of 
interest expenses. Several studies were conducted to analyse the impact and influence of 
tax benefits in M&A activity. Auberbach and Reishus (1986) evaluate the potential tax 
benefits companies could obtain through this type of operation. The authors found that 
potential tax benefits could play an important role only for a small sample of M&A, 
however estimated gains from step-up and leverage increase were not relevant10. 
Similarly, Auberbach and Reishus (1987) concluded that the most significant tax benefit 
were the unused tax credits and losses, especially when used by the acquiring company 
                                                          
7 If the taxable income is not enough to offset the current year´s loss, the company can carryforwards 
the rest of unused tax credits for the next year, under certain rules. 
8 In USA, when a company deducts asset´s depreciation to the taxable income, tax payer is obliged to 
report the gains obtained from transfer of the asset. These gains are treated as ordinary income and 
subjected to capital gain tax. 
9 See Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
10 Only 1/3 of the total sample presented gains higher than 10% of the target´s market value. 
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to shelter income from the target company. Again, increasing leverage and step-up were 
not relevant tax factors. By comparing a sample of mergers with pseudomergers, to 
analyse M&A activity, Auberbach and Reishus (1988) found little evidence of gain from 
interest deductions, step-up and unused tax credits and losses.11 Hayn (1989) found a 
positive relationship between tax attributes of the acquired company (NOLs, unused tax 
credits or step-up asset basis) and abnormal returns obtained from both-side shareholders 
following the announcement period, suggesting that tax attributes could be a motivation 
for acquisitions.  
Potential gains arising from tax attributes can represent an increase in value of the 
combined firm, in the form of higher premiums paid by the acquired company12. Moore 
and Pruitt (1987) conclude that higher merger premiums at the announcement date are 
not due to tax motivation13, arguing that NOLs are priced in capital markets and are 
partially reflected in the shares price of loss firms. Kaplan (1989) have estimated the 
importance of tax benefits in premiums paid of 76 Management Buyouts (MBO) and 
concluded that these tax benefits were a significant source of wealth for MBO operations. 
The value of tax benefits (mostly from interest deductions) represented between 21% and 
142,6% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders, which is a wide and surprising 
range14. Erickson and Wang (2007) found that target´s organizational form influences the 
premium paid by the acquirer. By comparing two different organizational forms (S and 
C), they concluded that S corporations have higher premiums comparing to C 
corporations, once the sale can generate future tax deductions for the acquirer.15 Sherman 
                                                          
11 Previous studies presented by Auberbach and Reishus were subjected to many restrictions. 
12 See Gaugan (2015).  
13 With anti-merger tax-credit transfer provisions (TRA 1986), incentives for profitable firms to merge 
with loss firms were reduced due the probability of unused NOLs to expire. 
14 Moreover, the capital gains tax liability from the shares sold by pre-BO shareholders, represented 15% 
of the premium. 
15 These benefits represented 12% to 17% of deal´s value, mainly related to step-up in target asset basis. 
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(1972) pointed important tax advantages arising from conglomerate mergers, associated 
with the use of debt and better growth opportunities16. 
Potential tax benefits associated with unused tax losses and credits, increasing leverage, 
organizational structures can motivate merger and acquisitions activity and can usually 
be reflected in higher premiums paid by the acquirers. More recently tax avoidance has 
been studied as a consequence of M&A, rather than a determinant of such operations.  
2.2 Tax avoidance following M&A 
There is extent literature about multinationals tax avoidance activity around the world, 
mainly from US-based companies. Corporate tax avoidance can be defined as all tax 
planning transactions that clearly reduce the tax burden of a company. Usually, 
multinational firms are structured by a parent in a country with a specific tax jurisdiction 
and foreign affiliates with a different tax jurisdiction. Typically, these foreign affiliates 
are located in countries with lower statutory tax rates (tax havens) that can be very 
attractive for the parent to incur in some tax planning schemes to reduce its combined tax 
burden. As previously mentioned, US is one of developed countries with higher statutory 
tax rate (35%) and one of the few with a worldwide taxation system17. Contrary to most 
of the developed countries, where foreign income is only taxed in the foreign country, US 
multinationals pay additional taxes from the income of their foreign subsidiaries when 
the income is repatriated to the US.18 Clearly, this system makes US companies less 
competitive when compared with countries with an exemption tax system19. Hence, US 
multinational firms are increasingly becoming more tax aggressive and entering in tax 
                                                          
16 Conglomerates offer better growth and expansion opportunities, using its earnings instead of paying 
dividends, subjected to high capital gains tax rate.  
17 According to EY (2015) report, only 6 out of 34 OECD countries have a worldwide taxation system.  
18 The additional tax paid from foreign income is called repatriation tax rate. 
19 Dividends from foreign business activities usually are not taxed under tax exemption system (See ICC 
Policy Statement (2003)). 
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schemes and tax planning to avoid taxes20. Cross-border M&As might offer an 
opportunity for corporate tax avoidance. Huizinga and Voget (2009) have studied the 
effect of international tax system on the structure of cross-border M&A operations. They 
found that international double tax liabilities21 affect the organizational structure of 
multinationals after cross-border M&A. Moreover, concluded that countries with low 
level of double taxation are more likely to attract parent firms. Barrios et al. (2012) found 
surprising conclusions about the importance of taxes on foreign subsidiaries location. The 
authors conclude that the combination of foreign income taxation and supplementary 
parent income taxation are independent and may disincentive the foreign subsidiary 
location choice22. Huizinga et al. (2012) evaluate the impact of additional international 
taxation on the target company. The authors concluded that target shareholders bear the 
total additional international taxation resulting from the cross-border transaction. Total 
tax costs of the operation are fully supported by target shareholders, not affecting 
acquiring shareholders. Becker and Fuest (2010) found that in M&A operations, tax credit 
system23 possibly is not optimal and that exemption system can take parent companies to 
overinvest in low tax countries. 
As previously defined, corporate tax avoidance is referred as all tax planning transactions 
that explicitly reduce the amount of taxes paid by a company. Concepts such as tax 
shelter, tax aggressiveness, tax planning and tax evasion are strongly associated with the 
notion of tax avoidance (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). There are several measures of tax 
avoidance present in the literature. The most widely measure used in the literature to test 
                                                          
20 See Klassen and Laplante (2012). 
21 These international tax liabilities represent non-resident withholding taxes. 
22 This result is explained by the option of parent company to defer taxes paid on foreign income until 
being repatriated. 
23 Tax credit system allow companies to receive a tax credit from taxes paid on foreign income. Tax 
credit system allow companies to receive a tax credit from taxes paid on foreign income. This tax credit 
can then be deducted, with some limitations, to parent ´s domestic taxes 
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evidence of changes in corporate tax avoidance is the effective tax rate (ETR). Rego 
(2003) have studied if economies of scale for international operations result in more tax 
avoidance opportunities. The author found evidence of economies of scale for tax 
planning. The author adds that while larger firms have higher ETRs24, multinational firms 
with greater pre-tax income and more extensive foreign operations exhibit lower ETRs. 
Mills et al. (1998) have analyzed how much firms invest in tax planning. Similarly, the 
authors concluded that larger firms invest less in tax planning than smaller firms. 
Moreover, firms with foreign operations also spend more in tax planning than firms with 
no foreign activity. Dyreng et al. (2010) found that the levels of corporate tax avoidance 
can be highly influenced by executives. The authors observed that corporate tax 
avoidance is more pronounced with the entry of the executive and that, ends after the 
executive leaves the company. Arguing that top executives can effectively manage firm 
tax expenses reducing ETR ratios.   
There is no accordance in the literature as to whether leverage increases following an 
M&A. Ghosh and Jain (2000) empirically found strong evidence of higher financial 
leverage levels following mergers. The authors have observed an average (permanent) 
increase of 17% comparing to leverage levels of the combined firm before the merge25. 
Nevertheless, Graham and Tucker (2006) concluded that firms that engage in tax shelters 
have less debt ratios. The authors add that interest tax deductibility benefit is much lower 
than the tax savings generated by tax shelters, being seen as substitutes for tax purposes.  
Multinational tax avoidance activities are strictly associated with advantages that 
different tax jurisdictions countries typically offer (Schwarz, 2009). Multinationals firms 
(MNFs) have the advantage to shift generated income between countries with different 
                                                          
24 Larger firms have higher ETRs due to political costs. 
25 Levels of increased leverage remain for 5 years after the merge. 
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tax jurisdiction26. Income shifting can be made by setting intra-firm transfer prices on 
parent-affiliate operations, by choosing intellectual property location or by planning the 
moment when foreign income received is repatriated27. MNFs can shift income by 
increasing (decreasing) export prices to high-tax regions (tax havens)28. Clausing (2003) 
found that country´s tax rate affects significantly the intra-firm trade prices. Intangible 
assets transfer offers a unique opportunity for income shifting strategies (Karkinsky & 
Riedel, 2012). Since intellectual property, like patents, are not a homogeneous good, it is 
more difficult to have a comparable market price for such transaction, according to arms-
length principle. Governments are extremely concerned with MNFs´ tax aggressiveness 
to reduce, at any cost, their tax burden. Klassen and Laplante (2012) found evidence that 
firms in US with lower average foreign tax rates are more aggressive income shifters due 
to changes in US tax policy29. They estimated that, between 2005 and 2009, companies 
with lower average foreign tax rates have shifted more $10 billion per year out of United 
States30. The high statutory tax rate imposed by US government can be the origin of 
increasingly tax avoidance activity of US firms. Clausing (2009) found evidence of the 
tax rate-gap between US and foreign countries being the responsible of increasing tax 
avoidance incentives and revenue lost, pointing formulary apportionment of international 
income as a solution for income shifting. EY (2015) report estimated the impact of a 
reduction in US statutory corporate tax rate on cross-border M&A. A reduction of 10 ppt 
in statutory corporate tax rate would avoid that 1,300 US companies and affiliates left to 
OECD foreign acquirers: “…Unites States would have shifted from a $179 billion deficit 
with OECD countries to a $590 billion surplus, a $769 billion shift”.  
                                                          
26 See Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) 
27 (e.g. United States) 
28 High-tax affiliates decrease pre-tax profit while tax heaven affiliates increase their profitability. 
29 Decrease of regulatory costs, less IRS audit intensity and increase in transfer-pricing enforcement 
activities out of US. 
30 By comparing with period from 1988 to 1992. 
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In the last years, it has been observed an increasingly pattern of cross-border M&A tax 
inversion deals. A cross-border M&A tax inversion occurs when parent firm moves its 
headquarters to a foreign country, so that the foreign firm becomes the “parent”. Clearly, 
these agreements have emerged for tax purposes (Marples & Gravelle, 2014). By 
changing its headquarters to a low-tax country, the combined tax rate of the merged 
company reduces significantly. Desai and Hines (2002) have investigated the 
determinants of corporate inversions. They concluded that larger and more leveraged 
firms are more likely to invert. Countries such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Panama or 
British Virgin Islands have no corporate income tax rates, being considered pure tax 
havens31. However, other countries in Europe, like Ireland, Netherlands or Liechtenstein, 
though not being considered pure tax havens, have very low corporate income tax rates32. 
Desai et al. (2006) have studied the reasons for transactions in tax havens. The authors 
found that the affiliates were allocated in large tax haven countries with the purpose of 
transferring taxable income. 
Although there is extent literature showing evidence of tax avoidance strategies of 
multinational companies among countries, few studies present tax avoidance strategies as 
consequence of M&A activity. Belz et al. (2013) have studied changes in tax avoidance 
of targets of European M&A. They have observed a 3% decrease in target´s ETR 
following M&A and even, an 8% decrease for tax aggressive acquirers. However, this 
result was obtained graphically, so there is no empirical proof that, effectively, exist tax 
avoidance following M&A deal. 
To sum up, there are several potential tax benefits that companies can acquire through a 
M&A agreement. Empirical studies show that multinational firms engage in tax 
                                                          
31 See Kudrle (2016). 
32 For the full list of OECD tax heaven list (See Gravelle; 2015). 
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avoidance activities to reduce its tax burden. Although it is claimed that these operations 
are done with tax motivation in mind, there exist still lack of evidence on the literature 
proving it. 
2.3 Research Hypotheses 
The purpose of this research is to search for evidence as to whether the level of corporate 
tax avoidance increases following an M&A operation. Is this evidence more pronounced 
for cross-border M&As operations? Can M&A deals between companies from the same 
sector provide tax synergies? Do some companies provide better tax conditions for M&A 
(e.g. lower tax rates, net operating losses)?  
A concurrent paper by Belz et al. (2013) analysed the change in target´s ETR before and 
after deal, and found evidence of a 3% reduction following the deal. Nevertheless, their 
paper only documents such change graphically and such effect is only found for the target, 
thus it is relevant to perform a deeper analysis. The first research hyphotesis is as follows: 
H1: There is a decrease in acquirer´s effective tax rate following a M&A deal. 
Companies from same industry may have potential gains arising from M&A operation as 
reducing competition, economies of scale or increasing market power. Ciobanu et al. 
(2014) concluded that companies being from similar industry increases the probability of 
a success takeover. Devos et al. (2008) have estimated synergy gains arising from M&A. 
The authors found that tax savings represented 1.64% of additional gain, while operating 
synergies represented the remaining 8.38%.  Thus, companies from the same industry, 
can also save higher amounts of taxes, which motives our second research hyphotesis: 
H2: There is a decrease in acquirer´s effective tax rate following the M&A deal if both 
acquirer and target belong to the same industry sector. 
 15 
 
International tax rate differences among countries can influence the location of FDI and 
M&A flows. Erel et al. (2012) concluded that international tax differences were an 
increasing function of attractiveness of FDI. Hence, companies with lower tax rates can 
be seen as more desirable targets to engage in tax avoidance strategies. This suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a decrease in acquirer´s effective tax rate following the M&A deal if, in the 
year before the M&A deal, the acquirer´s level of the tax avoidance is higher than the 
target´s level of corporate tax avoidance. 
The literature relates frequently the impact of potential tax attributes that companies have, 
on M&A operation. If a target firm has operating tax losses, these losses can be transferred 
to the acquirer, or vice-versa, in order to reduce its earnings (e.g. Auberbach & Reishus, 
1987). By offsetting the taxable income of the acquirer firm, it allows the acquirer to 
reduce the effective amount of taxes paid. Hence, the fourth hyphotesis is the following: 
H4: There is a decrease in acquirer´s effective tax rate following the M&A deal if target 
company presents losses the year before the M&A deal. 
Tracking the reasoning of H3, multinational firms can benefit from affiliates being located 
in low tax countries to engage in tax avoidance strategies via income shifting. Companies 
from certain industries can be strongly motivated to move their patents to low-tax 
countries and then charge a fee or royalty to high-tax country affiliates (See Dyreng et al. 
(2008)). As previously mentioned, it is difficult to establish the arm´s length principle for 
intangible assets, making it easier to shift income for companies in specific industries. 
Thus, the following hyphotesis is addressed: 
H5: There is a decrease in acquirer´s effective tax rate following cross-border M&A 
deals. 
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3 Empirical Research 
3.1.1 Data 
The initial sample comprises all completed European M&A available on Thomson 
Reuters Eikon database occurred between 2005 and 2014. The period choice was based 
on implementation of International Accounting Standards for European companies33, 
which increases comparability. By European M&A, we understand operations where both 
acquirer and target are European based. Several observations were excluded for the 
following reasons: European special member state territories were excluded due to 
restricted disclosure of financial data; we have also excluded deals where one or both 
companies had no identification code, which is essential to collect and match the financial 
data. All ownership percentages and forms of acquisition were considered in order to have 
a significant number of deals in our sample. After these steps, a sample of 1,031 deals 
was identified containing information about deal size, percentage acquired, transaction 
form, company´s nation, company industry, announcement date, form of transaction and 
company public status. The initial data covers 32 European countries, representing a total 
transaction value of 975€ billion, in which 334 M&As are cross-border deals, totalizing 
a transaction value of 404€ billion (41% of total transactions value). Figure 1 presents the 
total value of M&A transactions during 2005 and 2014, and the split value for cross-
border and domestic deals. We can observe that 2006 was the year with higher value of 
total transaction, with 245€ billion spent in M&A. The lowest year in transactions value, 
was 2009, following the Global Financial Crisis. In Figure 2, it is observed that 2007 was 
                                                          
33 From 1 of January of 2005, European companies were obliged to prepare their consolidated financial 
statements according to IAS (See Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (2002)). 
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the year with more deals (167 deals) in the sample. After 2008, there is evidence of a clear 
divergence between the number of cross-border and domestic deals in Europe.  
With the deals identified, we have collected financial statements data for both acquirer 
and target company for the same ten years, from 2005 to 2014, including headquarters 
location. The country base of a firm can be different from the headquarters location, so 
we deleted companies with headquarters out of Europe, in order to avoid possible 
misleading results. After collecting all the necessary data, the two data bases were 
merged, in order to associate the acquirer-target deal to its financial data. For the merger 
process, we have considered only one deal of each acquirer and target company. Once the 
merger was made by the identification code and by year, having more than one deal could 
imply an erroneous merger of both databases. A final sample of 10-years financial 
statement data was obtained for 707 deals, 226 of which are cross-border deals, from 27 
different business sectors and 34 European countries. Because some variables used in this 
study are not available for all years and deals, the sample was further narrowed to 359 
deals. Table 1 summarizes the process described above, as the number of acquirer firms 
per headquarters´ country. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Measuring Corporate Tax Avoidance 
In this research, to test our research hypotheses, three measures of tax avoidance were 
applied, in a similar approach to Chen et al. (2010) study. The authors applied two tax 
rate measures: Book ETR34 and Cash ETR, and two other book-tax measures:  MPBT35 
and DDBT36. Nonetheless, due to lack of available data, in this study only two of these 
                                                          
34 Also known as GAAP ETR in US context. 
35 Manzon-Plesko (2002) book-tax difference. 
36 Residual book-tax difference measure (See Desai and Dharmapala (2006)). 
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tax rate measures are used: Book ETR and Cash ETR. Book ETR (BETR) is defined as 
the ratio of income tax payable to EBT and was set as missing, when it assumed negative 
values or when higher than 1. This measure “reflects the aggregate proportion of the 
accounting income payable as taxes”37. The second measure, CASH ETR (CETR), is 
equal to cash taxes paid divided by EBT. Contrary to BETR, this measure captures tax 
deferral strategies38. These two measures of corporate tax avoidance only reflect non-
conforming tax avoidance, so we add a third measure which could reflect the conforming 
tax avoidance: cash taxes paid divided by operating cash flow (CONFTAX). This measure 
was initially proposed by Hanlon and Heitzmann (2010) and later tested by Salihu et al. 
(2013). The authors found that this measure was statistically different from Book ETR 
and Cash ETR39. The reason to apply all these different measures is trying to capture the 
many features of tax avoidance from different companies, to get more consistent results. 
All the three variables were truncated to range between 0 and 1. 
3.2.2 Econometric Approach 
The econometric analysis is based on corporate tax avoidance valuation model present in 
literature but focused on M&A deals. This model is present in several studies such as 
Rego (2003), Mills et al. (1998), Dyreng et al. (2010) or Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
applied to different contexts. The standard model consists in explaining tax avoidance, 
through ETR, as a function of different firm characteristics that work as control variables. 
At first glance, to test the impact on acquirer’s tax avoidance measures following the deal, 
we have created a dummy variable, D_afterdeal, which is equal to 1 from the year when 
the deal occurs until (2014) the end of the sample. By including this variable, in a 
                                                          
37 See Salihu et al. (2013). 
38 See Hanlon and Heitzmann (2010). 
39 In non-conforming tax avoidance is assumed that firms reduce simultaneously taxable income while 
increase book income. For conforming tax avoidance, if managers are not worried with market reactions 
to book income changes, they will reduce both book and taxable income (See Lee et al.;2015). 
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difference-in-differences model we expect to capture potential tax avoidance arising from 
the M&A operation itself and its effects during time.  
To test our first hypothesis, the following difference-in-differences model was estimated 
(equation 1): 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + β4𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
β5𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 + β6𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + β7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + β8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
β10𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + β11𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑧
27
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡
10
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑐
34
𝑐=1 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡 ,                              (eq. 1)  
where 𝜑𝑧  is industry fixed-effect specification for industry z;  𝛿𝑡 is the time fixed-effect 
variable for year t; 𝛾𝑐 represents country fixed-effect variable for country c and  ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡 is 
the error term.  TAXAVOID is the corporate tax avoidance measure representing each one 
of the three measures explained above. To control firms´ characteristics, we have used 
the following variables as proxies: LTOTALASSETS is equal to the natural log of total 
assets of the firm and is used as a proxy for firm´s size, CAPEX is given by the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets, INTANGIBLE is defined as goodwill divided by total 
assets. INVENTORY represents inventory intensity measured as the ratio of inventory to 
total assets, ROA is a measure of firms´ profitability, equal to the ratio of net income to 
total assets, PPE represents capital intensity, defined as the ratio of property plant and 
equipment (PP&E) to total assets, LEVERAGE is defined as long-term debt divided by 
total assets. EQUITY is equal to equity of the company divided by total assets. 
ACCRUALS is a measure of earnings management, and is given by the ratio of EBT to 
operating cash flow, all divided by total assets lagged. This variable aims to control for 
corporate tax avoidance derived from earnings management.40 Lastly, we have included, 
a country level variable, TRUST 41. This variable, which reflects the trust in government, 
                                                          
40 See Desai and Dharmapala (2009) 
41 Variable Trust was found in The Global Competitiveness Reports of World Economic Forum.  
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is a proxy for the culture of a country. Robinson and Slemrod (2012) include several 
economic, political and culture measures to study the determinants of tax system variation 
among countries. The authors found that TRUST was the most reliable determinant of tax 
system variation.  
To test the effect of M&A between companies from the same industry sector on acquirer´s 
tax avoidance, we have included, in equation (2), the variable D_afterdeal_indust42 : 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡                 
                                                                                                                                   (eq. 2) 
in which the same controls from equation (1) are used for all the equations. 
In Table 2, it is illustrated the industry sectors included in our sample, sorted by acquirer 
and target firm. We can observe that the higher number of firms belong to Banking & 
Investment Services (153), Software and Services (131) and Cyclical Consumer Services 
(87). 
Equation (3) aims to test the relationship between acquirer’s tax avoidance measures and 
D_afterdeal_Taxavoidt-1, which is given by the interaction of D_afterdeal and target´s 
Taxavoid measure the year before M&A. This variable is equal to 1 when the target´s 
Taxavoid measure is lower than acquirer´s Taxavoid the year before the deal, and 0 
otherwise. The economic reason for this hypothesis is that companies with lower tax rates 
can be seen as more desirable targets to engage in tax avoidance strategies. Each target´s 
Taxavoidt-1 measure corresponds to the same acquirer´s Taxavoid measure: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡            
                                                                                                                                   (eq. 3) 
                                                          
42 Given by the interaction of D_afterdeal and indust, in which indust is equal to 1 if both acquirer and 
target are from the same industry sector according to Thomas Reuters Business Classification (TRBC), 
and 0, otherwise 
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The fourth model assesses the potential benefit of target´s negative pre-tax income one 
year before deal in acquirer´s tax avoidance. Potential tax losses could be transfer from 
the target to the acquirer, or vice-versa, in order to reduce its earnings (e.g. Auberbach & 
Reishus, 1987). To achieve this result, it was included D_afterdeal_loss43, where loss is 
equal to 1 when target´s pre-tax income one year before deal is negative and 0, otherwise. 
Equation (4) is the following:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡          
                                                                                                                                   (eq. 4) 
To evaluate the potential impact in tax avoidance after an international M&A operation, 
we have included an interaction variable, D_afterdeal_domest, where domest is equal to 
1 if the operation is domestic and 0 if the operation is cross-border. The resultant equation 
(5) is presented below: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡 
                                                                                                                                                (eq. 5) 
Lastly, we have extended our analysis, regarding the combined effect of both firms being 
from the same industry sector and the target company having operational losses one year 
before the deal. To test this effect, we have created an interaction variable, 
D_afterdeal_indust_loss, which represents the interaction between D_afterdeal, 
D_indust and D_loss44. Equation (6) is illustrated below: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡 
                                                                                                                                                (eq. 6) 
Table 3 describes the variables applied in the econometric approach and the respective 
coefficient sign that is expected. 
                                                          
43 Interaction between D_afterdeal and loss. 
44 D_indust is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1, if both target and acquirer are from the same 
industry, and 0 otherwise. D_loss is equal to 1, if target´s pre-tax profit, in the year before deal is 
negative, and 0 otherwise. 
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3.2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 summarizes statistics description of the variables used in the equations described 
above45. Regarding the three tax avoidance measures, acquirer´s BETR mean is equal to 
16.5%, the lowest of three, with CETR and CONFTAX means being equal to 26.3% and 
20.7%, respectively. The standard deviation of this 3 measures are significantly high with 
0.165, 0.171 and 0.169, respectively. It should be noted that the value for ROA is equal 
to 0.061, which means that the average acquirer presents a positive net income. The 
average level of leverage ratio of acquirer is equal to 0.174, which means that 17.4% of 
total assets is long-term debt. Equity´s mean (median) ratio is equal to 0.415 (0.401), 
which mean that, on average, investors own 41.5% of total assets of the firm46. 
In Table 5, it is represented the coefficients of the pairwise Pearson correlation between 
the main variables. All tax avoidance measures seem to be statistically related with each 
other, expect BETR with CONFTAX. ROA and TA are negatively related with BETR and 
CETR. Regarding previous literature of the relation between BETR and firm level control 
variables, there seems to exist a consistent relationship. For example, LTOTALASSETS is 
positely correlated (correlation 0.05; p-value 0.00) with BETR, while EQUITY is 
negatively correlated (correlation -0.210; p-value 0.00) with BETR. 
4 Results 
Tables 6 to 10 present the initial results for our research hypotheses. The regression 
analysis is conducted using three different alternative proxies for corporate tax avoidance: 
BETR, CETR and CONFTAX47. In Table 6, three equations are performed, which 
                                                          
45 The descriptive statistics of control variables correspond to BETR as the tax avoidance measure 
applied. 
46 Although LEVERAGE and EQUITY are highly correlated, we find no evidence of multicollinearity. 
47 An additional measure for long-run cash tax avoidance was tested. However, it was not included 
because even after deal, this measure is capturing level of corporate the tax avoidance before the deal 
(See Dyreng et al. (2008)).   
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correspond to H1. From Table 7 to 10, interaction variables described above are added to 
the equations from Table 6, according to the remaining hypotheses.  Additional tests were 
performed for a more reliable analysis of the results. To test the specification of the model, 
we have performed the Ramsey regression specification-error test (RESET) for omitted 
variables, and we concluded that all regressions had no omitted variables. For spurious 
regression diagnostic, we have performed a Durbin-Watson test for all regressions. No 
evidence of spurious regression was found. We have also tested for the multicollinearity, 
and no evidence of multicollinearity was found for all the regressions48. To control 
heteroskedasticity, we have used Huber-White estimator to obtain robust standard 
errors49. 
4.1 Hypotheses Results 
 
4.1.1 Tax avoidance following M&A deal  
Focusing on Table 6, we can observe a negative coefficient for D_afterdeal variable, in 
columns (1) and (2), when using BETR and CETR. Although the sign is consistent with 
our hypothesis, there is no statistical evidence of higher corporate tax avoidance for the 
acquirer following an M&A operation. Belz et al. (2013) found, graphically, a decrease 
of ETR after the deal but for the target company. Overall, although taxes might influence 
a M&A operation, it is inconclusive as to whether, the overall level of corporate tax 
avoidance is affected by an M&A deal.  
Regarding the control variables, summarizing the impact of the control variables in our 
tax avoidance measures, it is observed that Ltotalassets is positive for all 3 measures, 
although it is statistically significant only when CETR and CONFTAX are applied. This 
                                                          
48 Applying the variance inflation factor (VIF), VIF values for coefficient were never higher than 3, except 
for equation (6), in which D_afterdeal presented a VIF approximately equal to 4. 
49 Robust standard errors are applied in all estimated equations. 
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result is consistent with the literature (e.g. Rego, 2003; Zimmerman, 1983) which 
suggests that larger firms support higher tax burdens. For Capex, there is statistical 
evidence of positive relationship with BETR, which is consistent with Dyreng et al. 
(2010). Acquirers with higher levels of capital expenditures seem to have higher book 
ETRs. However, with CETR, it has a negative and significant relationship.  Intangibles 
as described above are given by the ratio of goodwill to total assets. We find evidence of 
a very significant and positive relationship with all tax avoidance measures. It seems that 
acquirers with high amounts of subscribed goodwill in their financial statements, face 
higher tax burdens. There is extent literature about goodwill, in the context of business 
combinations, regarding the valuation of these intangibles in purchase premiums.  
International Financial Reporting Standard 3 (IFRS 3) establishes the principles and 
requirements that acquirers should apply to measure goodwill. An accurate measurement 
of goodwill isn’t simple once, first, it is difficult to assign a discrete value for these assets, 
and second, it is not easy to know how changes in value should be treated after their 
recognition in financial statements50. For Inventories, there is a positive and significant 
relationship with BETR and CONFTAX. This result is consistent with Gupta and 
Newberry (1997) contrary to Mills et al. (1998), who found no consistent relationship 
between inventory intensity and tax expenditures. For ROA, there is statistically evidence 
of a negative relationship with the three measures. This is consistent with Mills et al. 
(1998) that more profitable firms engage in more tax planning activities. Accruals, as 
measure of earnings management, it is significantly and positively related with CASH 
ETR and CONFTAX.  
                                                          
50 See Abeysekera (2012). Norbäck et al. (2009) also found that goodwill treatment had impact in foreign 
acquisitions pattern. 
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4.1.2 Tax avoidance following M&A deal in the same industry 
The second research hypothesis is tested in Table 7, by adding an interaction variable 
between D_afterdeal and D_industry. We find statistical evidence of an inverse 
relationship between D_afterdeal_indust and BETR, in column (1). The result suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, acquirer´s BETR decreases by, approximately, 3% after deal, if both 
acquirer and target belong to the same industry sector. These results are consistent with 
Fee and Thomas (2004) findings, who found evidence of stronger operating performance 
the year after the merge, for a sample of horizontal mergers. Healy et al. (1992) found 
evidence of higher operating cash-flow after merger, for a sample of US firms. Although 
not tabulated, the average EBT for all the acquirers from horizontal M&As, in our sample, 
is equal to $3.06 billion. Thus, for horizontal M&A operations, a decrease in BETR of 3% 
would represent, on average, $0.09 billions of tax savings for the average acquirer.  
4.1.3 Tax avoidance following M&A deal when target has lower ETR 
Table 8 tests H3, which aims to test whether acquirer´s effective tax rate decreases if the 
target´s effective tax rate is lower one period before deal. The results suggest that there is 
no evidence of lower level of corporate tax avoidance following M&A operation when, 
the period before, acquirer´s ETR is higher than target´s ETR. The three tax avoidance 
measures exhibit a negative sign, however, none presents statistical significance. In order 
to better understand this ambiguous result, an untabulated analysis was performed by 
computing the mean of each tax avoidance measure, for both acquirer and target, one year 
before the deal. The mean difference among companies varies between 1% and 2%, in 
absolute terms, which is somehow consistent with our results in Table 8.  
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4.1.4 Tax avoidance following M&A deal when target has negative pre-tax profit 
The fourth hypothesis, in Table 9, assesses whether the acquirer´s level of corporate tax 
avoidance increases if the target company presents negative pre-tax profit in the period 
pre-deal. We found statistical evidence of lower tax burden for the acquirer company if 
the target presents a negative pre-tax profit the period before deal. In all estimations, 
D_afterdeal_loss exhibit a negative sign, which is statistically significant when BETR 
and CONFTAX are applied. Based on the results, it is expected a decrease in ETR between 
6% and 9% for the acquirer company following the M&A deal. Our results are consistent 
with previous findings, such as in Auberbach and Reishus (1986;1987;1988) studies, who 
found evidence of potential gains in merger activity arising from transference of tax 
attributes from one company to offset the losses of the other, and Hayn (1989), who 
argued that tax attributes could be an important driver for acquisitions. Consistent with 
this findings, is the idea that target NOLs carryforwards can be seen as an economic asset 
for the target company, in the sense that can reduce the amount of taxes paid in the 
future51. 
4.1.5 Tax avoidance following cross-border M&A deal  
Table 10 presents our final hypothesis (H5), which assesses whether acquirer´s tax burden 
is lower when the deal is cross-border, in contrast with domestic ones. The results 
obtained evidence ambiguous conclusions for this hypothesis. On one hand, the results 
present a negative relation between BERT and D_afterdeal_domest, which means that 
acquirer´s BETR will decrease after deal, if the operation is made between companies 
operating in the same country. This result can possible be explained by the increase of 
market power in acquirer´s country, leading to a stronger operational performance post-
                                                          
51 See Bottomlee et al. (2009) 
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deal. However, it is contrary to the theory that companies from high-tax jurisdiction enter 
in M&A deals with companies from low-tax countries, in order to reduce the amount of 
taxes paid via income shifting (e.g. transfer prices). Erel et al. (2012) found that taxes 
seem to influence cross-border mergers decision, once acquirer is usually from a higher-
tax jurisdiction country than target.  It is important to note that, the authors have included 
mergers from companies all over the world, while in this research, only European M&A 
were included. The average corporate tax rate difference between all acquirer´s and target 
firms for our sample, corresponds to 0.4%, which is quite low. On the other hand, when 
we use CONFTAX, in equation (3), a statistical evidence of a positive effect between 
CONFTAX and D_afterdeal_domest is found. This result suggests that, acquirer´s 
CONFTAX will decrease by 2% whether the deal is cross-border. Overall, the results 
obtained are inconclusive, once different tax avoidance measures give different 
conclusions, regarding the effect of the deal be cross-border or domestic.  
4.1.6 Further analysis  
Based on the results obtained in H2 and H4, a further analysis was performed. In Table 
11, we tested jointly whether there is evidence of tax avoidance, when acquirer and target 
belong to the same industry sector and the target company presents operational losses the 
year before the deal. The results evidence a negative relationship between 
D_afterdeal_indust_loss and BETR. In column (1), this result suggests statistical evidence 
of a 9% decrease in acquirer’s BETR, meaning that ETR decreases even further for deals 
in which both companies operate in the same industry and the target has losses in the year 
pre-deal. 
4.2 Robustness Checks 
To access the robustness of our results, we have performed several sensitivity analyses. 
Four country level variables that could be relevant to explain M&A activity and its 
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relationship with tax avoidance were introduced. The literature refers many times the 
relationship between horizontal mergers and anti-trust policy. Many large firms enter into 
anti-competitive horizontal mergers, in order to eliminate competition and increase its 
market power (Lee, 2013). These operations, made by monopolistic firms can seriously 
affect the efficiency of the market. Anti-trust laws play a relevant role by maintaining the 
basic rules of competition, in order to avoid these monopolistic practices52. Thus, a 
measure of effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy (Anti-trust), for each country was added 
as component of domestic competition. A proxy for the macroeconomic environment of 
a country (Macroeconomic) was introduced. Erel et al. (2012) found that macroeconomic 
performance could make cross-border M&A more attractive for acquiring firms. Choi 
and Jeon (2011) also found a long-run equilibrium relationship between some 
macroeconomic variables and merger activity. The variable Macroeconomic is a 
composition of several indicators of the country53. The quality and strength of accounting 
standards affects the volume of M&A activity, once it is fundamental, a good disclosure 
for the identification of potential targets (Rossi & Volpin (2004)54. Bris and Cabolis 
(2008) have built some measures of change in investor protection. The authors found a 
positive relationship between the quality of shareholders´ protection and accounting 
standards in acquirer´s country and the merger premium paid in cross-border deals, 
relatively to domestic deals. Thus, the variable Accounting was added as a measure of 
strength of auditing and accounting standards. Finally, we introduced the variable R&D, 
which reflects the level of R&D spending by companies in a country, relative to 
international peers. Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) found that international M&A operations 
                                                          
52 Anti-competitive practices such as predatory pricing and exclusive dealing (See Armstrong and Porter, 
2007). 
53 This variable includes government budget balance, gross national savings, inflation, government debt 
and country credit ranking, all taken from Global Competitiveness Report. 
54 The authors used an index of the quality of accounting standards as a proxy for investors protection 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998). 
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can stimulate R&D expansion. Furthermore, several countries have tax incentive policies 
for companies to increasing their R&D expenditures55. Additionally, for this analysis, 
deals involving companies from the financial sector56  were excluded, once this sector has 
to follow different regulations that non-financial firms. In Table 12, we test the robustness 
of H1, and it is observed that the inclusion of the new variables does not change the initial 
conclusions. Moreover, although not tabulated, all other hypotheses were tested and we 
found that all initial results are robust. Analyzing the effect of the new variables on tax 
avoidance measures, Anti-trust appears to be negatively related with CETR and 
CONFTAX. This result indicates that the higher the level of effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policy in acquirer’s country, the lower the amount of taxes paid by the acquirer 
firm. For R&D, there is statistical evidence of a positive relationship with CONFTAX, 
indicating that the higher the level of R&D spending in acquirer´s country, the lower the 
level of conforming tax avoidance.  
In order to triangulate our results, a factor analysis was performed. It is based on a 
principal component analysis, in which the three tax avoidance measures were 
incorporated into a one single factor. Table 13 presents the results obtained in this 
analysis. The results suggest that D_afterdeal_loss, D_afterdeal_domest and 
D_afterdeal_indust_loss seem to be negative and statistically significant when all 
measures are combined, which is consistent with our initial findings. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient for D_afterdeal_indust does not appear to be statistically significant. The 
effect of this variable is dissipated, when the three tax measures are combined into one 
single factor. 
                                                          
55 European Commission set out investment in R&D as one of their 5 priorities to increase Europe´s 
competitiveness (See Straathof et al., 2014). 
56 Companies from Banking and Investments Services and Collective Investments industry sector. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the change in the level of corporate tax avoidance following an 
M&A deal. Five hypotheses were tested on a sample of 359 deals, involving 34 European 
countries, for a period of 10 years, between 2005 and 2014. Three measures of tax 
avoidance were used in order to capture the main features arising from tax avoidance. 
Regarding the main hypothesis, no evidence of tax avoidance following an M&A 
operation was found for all three measures. On one hand these findings are, in part, 
contrary to Belz et al. (2013), who found a decrease of ETR by 3% following M&A deal. 
On the other hand, the authors simply shown this reduction graphically. Additional 
analysis found that, if both acquirer and target operate in the same industry, acquirer´s 
book effective tax rate is reduced by about 3% following deal. A possible explanation is 
the increase of operational synergies arising from horizontal mergers, consistent with Fee 
and Thomas (2004) findings. No evidence of tax avoidance following M&A was found, 
when 1 year after deal target´s tax rate is lower than acquirer´s tax rate. The lower average 
tax rate difference between acquirers and targets in the sample, might explain this result. 
Further analysis on this is recommend, perhaps, including only deals where the tax rate 
difference between both companies is more relevant. We have also found evidence of tax 
avoidance following M&A, if the target had negative pre-tax income the year before deal. 
The acquirer´s tax burden is reduced between 6.2% and 8.6%. This reduction increases 
to about 9% for book ETR if the deal is horizontal and the target had negative pre-tax 
income one year before deal, simultaneously. This result is consistent with, e.g. Hayn 
(1989), regarding the potential transfer of tax attributes from acquirer to target, and vice-
versa, in order to reduce the amount of taxes paid. Finally, regarding the effect of 
domestic vs cross-border deals in tax avoidance, we found ambiguous results. When book 
ETR is used there is evidence of lower taxes paid for the acquirer firm, if the deal is 
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domestic, rather than if it is cross-border. However, when CONFTAX is used, the contrary 
result is obtained. In part, this result is surprising, since it is contrary to the theory of 
cross-border deals as a way for MNEs to shift income for low-tax jurisdiction countries, 
in order to avoid taxes. It can possible be explained by the increase of market power in 
acquirer´s country, leading to a stronger operational performance post-deal. These 
findings add a small but relevant contribution to the literature of corporate tax avoidance 
and M&A. First, this research provides empirical research of corporate tax avoidance in 
the context of M&A, which until now, the literature has focused timidly on this. Second, 
several findings regarding some features of M&A operations, such as horizontal mergers 
or operating losses, were also introduced in the context of tax avoidance. 
Notwithstanding, the hypothesis of lower taxes paid by the acquirer if target presented 
lower tax avoidance measure the year before deal failed, due to low tax differences 
between both acquirer and target firm. Despite our findings, more research on this field 
is still required. Not only focusing on European mergers, the inclusion of other countries 
other than US and Europe could provide some interesting findings in this field. Taking 
advantage of the growing tax inversion activity, especially between US and European 
companies, could be also interesting to include.  
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7 Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Total M&A transaction value by sort of deal (2005 through to 2014) 
 
Notes: Figure 1 plots the total transaction value (in Millions €) of all M&A deals occurred between 2005 
and 2014, taken from Thomson Reuters Eikon, sorted by deal (cross-border or domestic). 
 
Figure 2: Total number of M&A deals by sort of deal (2005 through to 2014) 
 
Notes: Figure 2 plots the total number of M&A deals occurred between 2005 and 2014 taken from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon, sorted by deal (cross-border or domestic).
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Table 1: Headquarters statistics and database construction 
 
Notes: The excluded Non-European countries were: Bermuda, Cayman Island, Curacao, Singapore, New Zealand and United 
States of America. Some firms only presented data for the year of 2014. 
 
     
              
Headquarters  Acquirers  Percentage  Database construction 
Austria 1 0.15  Initial sample (unbalanced)   
Belgium 27 4.01  M&A deals  1,031 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 0.15  Financial Data  15,910 
Bulgaria 1 0.15  Headquarters  41 
Croatia 1 0.15  Non-European    6 
Cyprus 9 1.34  Excluded:   
Czech Republic 2 0.30  Non-European   60 
Denmark 35 5.20  Firms with not 10-years 
observations 
 1,140 
Estonia 1 0.15    
Finland 26 3.86  Financial Data (clean sample)   14,770 
France 158 23.48  Merger of both databases     
Germany 99 14.71  Acquirer firms  707 
Greece 1 0.15  Target firms   707 
Hungary 1 0.15  Final sample (balanced)   
Iceland 1 0.15  Acquirer financial data  7,070 
Ireland 12 1.78  Target financial data  7,070 
Italy 1 0.15  Headquarters   34 
Kazakhstan 1 0.15     
Lithuania 1 0.15     
Luxembourg 4 0.59     
Netherlands 40 5.94     
Norway 44 6.54     
Poland 1 0.15     
Portugal 1 0.15     
Romania 8 1.19     
Russia 46 6.84     
Serbia 2 0.30     
Slovakia 1 0.15     
Slovenia 1 0.15     
Spain 1 0.15     
Sweden 77 11.44     
Switzerland 66 9.81     
Turkey 1 0.15     
Ukraine 1 0.15         
Total 673 100.00         
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Table 2: Industry descriptive statistics 
       
  All Firms Acquirer Firm Target Firm 
Industry Sector (TRBC) Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Agriculture & Livestock 3 0.22 1 0.14 2 0.31 
Applied Resources 17 1.26 9 1.28 8 1.24 
Automobiles & Components 21 1.56 9 1.28 12 1.87 
Banking & Investment Services 153 11.38 96 13.68 57 8.86 
Chemicals 23 1.71 13 1.85 10 1.56 
Collective Investments 11 0.82 7 1.00 4 0.62 
Cyclical Consumer Products 56 4.16 26 3.70 30 4.67 
Cyclical Consumer Services 87 6.47 47 6.70 40 6.22 
Energy-Fossil Fuels 59 4.39 33 4.70 26 4.04 
Food & Beverages 75 5.58 39 5.56 36 5.6 
Healthcare Services 35 2.60 17 2.42 18 2.8 
Industrial Commercial Services 84 6.25 44 6.27 40 6.22 
Industrial Conglomerates 7 0.52 6 0.85 1 0.16 
Industrial Goods 86 6.39 43 6.13 43 6.69 
Insurance 31 2.30 17 2.42 14 2.18 
Investment Holding Companies 24 1.78 16 2.28 8 1.24 
Mineral Resources 69 5.13 36 5.13 33 5.13 
Other Services 3 0.22 0 0.00 3 0.47 
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Research 56 4.16 27 3.85 29 4.51 
Real Estate 81 6.02 40 5.70 41 6.38 
Renewable Energy 6 0.45 4 0.57 2 0.31 
Retailers 51 3.79 26 3.70 25 3.89 
Software & Services 131 9.74 64 9.12 67 10.42 
Technology Equipment 42 3.12 16 2.28 26 4.04 
Telecommunications Services 49 3.64 25 3.56 24 3.73 
Transportation 51 3.79 24 3.42 27 4.2 
Utilities 34 2.53 17 2.42 17 2.64 
Total 1345 100.00 702 100 643 100.00 
  
Notes: This table present all company industries included on this sample and describe the percentage of each industry for both 
acquirer and target company. The industry classification was made according to Thomson Reutures Business Classification 
(TRBC) terminology. 
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Table 3: Variables definition 
Variable Description (predicted sign) Definition 
Tax avoidance measures 
(Taxavoid)   
BETR Book effective tax rate Income tax payable divided by earnings before 
taxes.  Book ETR is truncated to the range 
between 0 and 1.   
  
CETR Cash effective tax rate Cash tax paid divided by earnings before taxes. 
CETR is truncated to the range between 0 and 1.   
   
CONFTAX Conforming tax avoidance Difference between earnings before taxes and 
cash flow from operating activities CONFTAX is 
truncated to the range between 0 and 1. 
  
  
Controls   
SIZE Size of the firm (+) Natural log of total assets. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures (-) Capital expenditures scaled by total assets. 
INTANGIBLE Intangibles (?) Goodwill scaled by total assets. 
INVENTORY Inventory intensity (+) Inventory scaled by total assets. 
ACCRUALS Accruals (?) Difference between earnings before taxes and 
operating cash flow divided by lagged total 
assets.   
ROA Return on assets (-) Net income divided by total assets. 
PPE Capital intensity (-) Property, plant and equipment (PP&E) scaled by 
total assets. 
  
LEVERAGE Leverage (-) Long-term debt divided by total assets. 
EQUITY Equity value (-) Equity value of the firm. 
   
Country-level variables    
TRUST Trust (?) Cultural variable used by Robinson and Slemrod 
(2012), which measures trust in politicians. The 
survey question was: “Public trust in the 
financial honesty of politicians", 1 is very low 
and 7 is very high. 
  
  
  
  
 
ANTITRUST Anti-Trust (?) Country-level variable, which measures the 
effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy. The 
survey question was: “In your country, to what 
extent does anti-monopoly policy promote 
competition?”, 1 is does not promote 
competition and 7 effectively promotes 
competition. 
  
  
  
  
  
 
MACROECONOMIC Macroeconomic (?) Country-level variable, which measures the 
quality of macroeconomic environment, in 
which, 1 worst and 7 best. This variable is a 
combination of other 5 variables: Government 
budget balance; Gross national savings; 
Inflation; Government debt; Country credit 
ranking. 
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ACCOUNTING Accounting standards (?) Country-level variable, which measures the 
strength of auditing and reporting standards. The 
survey question was: “In your country, how 
strong are financial auditing and reporting 
standards?”, 1 is extremely weak and 7 
extremely strong. 
  
  
  
  
  
 
R&D Research and Development (?)    
Country-level variable, which measures 
company spending in R&D. The survey question 
was: “In your country, to what extent do 
companies spend on research and development 
(R&D)?”, 1 is do not spend on R&D and 7 spend 
heavily on R&D. 
  
  
  
  
 
Hypothesis Variables   
   
D_afterdeal                  (-) Dummy variable equal to 1 from the year the 
deal occurs until the end of the sample period 
(2014), and 0, otherwise. 
 
  
  
D_afterdeal_indust                  (-) Interaction between D_afterdeal and indust, in 
which, indust is equal to 1 if both acquirer and 
target belong to the same industry sector, and 0, 
otherwise. 
  
  
  
D_afterdeal_taxavoidt-1                  (-) Interaction between D_afterdeal and taxavoidt-1, 
in which, taxavoidt-1 is equal to 1 if each 
corresponding tax avoidance measure is lower 
for target company than for acquirer the year 
before the deal, and 0 otherwise. 
  
  
  
  
D_afterdeal_loss                  (-) Interaction between D_afterdeal and loss, in 
which, loss is equal to 1 if target´s earnings 
before tax is negative the year before the deal, 
and 0, otherwise. 
  
  
  
D_afterdeal_domest                  (-) Interaction between D_afterdeal and domest, in 
which, domest is equal to 1 if the deal is 
domestic, and 0, otherwise. 
  
  
  
 
D_afterdeal_indust_loss                  (-) Interaction between D_afterdeal, indust and 
loss, in which, indust is equal to 1 if both 
acquirer and target belong to the same industry 
sector, and 0, otherwise and loss is equal to 1 if 
target´s earnings before tax is negative the year 
before the deal, and 0, otherwise. 
  
  
  
  
   
i  Firm 
z  
Industry sector where the firm is inserted 
according to TRBC. 
  
c   Country from firm´s headquarters 
Notes: (1) The Global Competitiveness Report (WEF – World Economic Forum). 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables applied in this research Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
for the five measures of tax avoidance. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for firm level control variables. Descriptive 
statistics for tax avoidance measures were based on the corresponding regression. Controls statistics were based on BETR 
regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable    Obs     Mean 
 Std. 
Deviation 
      Min    Max 
1st 
Quartile 
Median 
3rd 
Quartile 
PANEL A: Tax avoidance measures       
BETR 2215 0.1650           0.1651 0.0000 1.0000 0.0610 0.1184 0.2092 
CETR 2234 0.2632    0.1710 0.0000 1.0000 0.1482 0.2429 0.3418 
CONFTAX 2440 0.2073     0.1690 0.0000 0.9990 0.0887 0.1722 0.2776 
         
PANEL B: Controls         
Ltotalassets 2215 22.3314     2.2684 16.3665 30.4673 20.6082 22.2382 23.9522 
Capex 2215 -0.0501    0.0413 -0.3219 0.0218 -0.0633 -0.0392 -0.0239 
Intangible 2215 0.1546    0.1349 -0.1304 0.6011 0.0404 0.1209 0.2396 
Inventories 2215 0.1063    0.0959 0.0000 0.7081 0.0218 0.0868 0.1663 
Accruals 2215 -0.0108    0.0962 -1.2390 2.0373 -0.0480 -0.0172 0.0177 
ROA 2215 0.0608    0.0508 -0.0528 0.5071 0.0277 0.0497 0.0788 
PPE 2215 0.2246    0.1767 -0.1497 1.1588 0.0877 0.1877 0.3067 
Leverage 2215 0.1741    0.1287 0.0000 0.7297 0.0745 0.1609 0.2509 
Equity 2215 0.4126    0.1649 -0.2410 0.9781 0.2980 0.4014 0.5105 
Trust 2215 4.5073    1.0421 1.5431 6.2076 3.6663 4.5484 5.4184 
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Table 5: Correlation analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This matrix reports univariate analyses. The symbol * represents significant a level of 5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
BETR (1) 1              
CETR (2) 0.22* 1             
CONFTAX (3) -0.01 0.51* 1            
D_afterdeal (4) 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1           
Ltotalassets (5) 0.05* 0.08* -0.01 -0.05* 1          
Capex (6) 0.05* 0.03 0.07* 0.02 0.09* 1         
Intangible (7) 0.08* 0.12* 0.09* 0.07* -0.16* 0.12* 1        
Inventories (8) 0.02 0.02 0.12* 0.02 -0.08* 0.12* -0.26* 1       
Accruals (9) -0.14* -0.11* 0.18* 0.01 0.04* 0.11* -0.08* 0.08* 1      
ROA (10) -0.26* -0.21* 0.11* 0.01 0.06* 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.28* 1     
PPE (11) -0.04* -0.02 -0.08* -0.02* 0.09* -0.47* -0.20* -0.07* -0.05* 0.02 1    
Leverage (12) 0.00 -0.06* -0.13* 0.04* 0.12* -0.18* 0.04* -0.16* -0.02 -0.02 0.27* 1   
Equity (13) -0.21* -0.09* 0.06* 0.01 -0.17* -0.03* 0.18* -0.03* 0.02 0.07* 0.04* -0.45* 1  
Trust (14) -0.01 -0.11* -0.05* 0.07* -0.05* 0.06* 0.08* 0.10* 0.00 0.00 -0.11* 0.01 0.02 1 
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Table 6: Effect of D_afterdeal variable on tax avoidance measures (Hypothesis 1) 
 
Notes: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + β4𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β5𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 +
β6𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + β7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + β8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β10𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + β11𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑧
27
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡
10
𝑡=1 +
∑ 𝛾𝑐
33
𝑐=1 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡 
The dependent variables are the 3 measures of tax avoidance, from equation (1) to (3), in which: BETR 
represents the book effective tax rate, CETR is the cash effective tax rate and CONFTAX is a measure of 
conforming tax avoidance. Firm characteristic variables were included as control variables. Fixed effects for 
year, country and industry were included in all equations. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, 
with t statistics in parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BETR CETR CONFTAX 
D_afterdeal -0.00687 -0.00358 0.00665 
 (-0.94) (-0.45) (0.94) 
    
Ltotalassets 0.00152 0.00478** 0.00592*** 
 (0.70) (2.10) (2.85) 
    
Capex 0.157* -0.326*** -0.140 
 (1.73) (-2.94) (-1.48) 
    
Intangible 0.0879*** 0.0914*** 0.0520* 
 (3.04) (2.73) (1.65) 
    
Inventories 0.0796* 0.0218 0.164*** 
 (1.78) (0.46) (2.80) 
    
Accruals -0.0490 0.115*** 0.529*** 
 (-0.86) (2.78) (3.74) 
    
ROA -0.873*** -0.971*** -0.0976* 
 (-9.08) (-10.97) (-1.66) 
    
PPE 0.00132 -0.0370 -0.0941*** 
 (0.05) (-1.05) (-3.45) 
    
Leverage -0.0957*** 0.0280 -0.0224 
 (-2.66) (0.74) (-0.66) 
    
Equity -0.114*** -0.00597 -0.0108 
 (-3.64) (-0.20) (-0.34) 
    
Trust -0.00493 -0.00879 0.00206 
 (-0.48) (-0.75) (0.18) 
    
Time FE YES YES YES 
    
Country FE YES YES YES 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
    
Constant 0.167*** 0.162* -0.00103 
 (2.59) (1.93) (-0.01) 
N 
Adj. R2 
2215 
0.164 
2234 
0.176 
2440 
0.184 
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Table 7: Effect of D_afterdeal_indust variable on tax avoidance measures ((Hypothesis 2) 
 
Notes: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡, in which the same controls 
from equation (1) are used for all the equations. 
The dependent variables are the 3 measures of tax avoidance, from equation (1) to (3), in which: BETR represents 
the book effective tax rate, CETR is the cash effective tax rate and CONFTAX is a measure of conforming tax 
avoidance. Firm characteristic variables were included as control variables. Fixed effects for year, country and 
industry were included in all equations. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, with t statistics in 
parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BETR CETR CONFTAX 
D_afterdeal 0.0126 -0.00898 0.00501 
 (1.07) (-0.73) (0.46) 
    
D_afterdeal_indust -0.0282** 0.00801 0.00245 
 (-2.21) (0.61) (0.20) 
    
Ltotalassets 0.00120 0.00485** 0.00595*** 
 (0.55) (2.13) (2.85) 
    
Capex 0.155* -0.324*** -0.139 
 (1.71) (-2.93) (-1.47) 
    
Intangible 0.0892*** 0.0905*** 0.0517* 
 (3.10) (2.71) (1.65) 
    
Inventories 0.0701 0.0237 0.164*** 
 (1.56) (0.50) (2.79) 
    
Accruals -0.0502 0.114*** 0.529*** 
 (-0.88) (2.76) (3.74) 
    
ROA -0.862*** -0.973*** -0.0980* 
 (-8.98) (-10.92) (-1.66) 
    
PPE 0.00418 -0.0375 -0.0941*** 
 (0.15) (-1.07) (-3.45) 
    
Leverage -0.0976*** 0.0296 -0.0219 
 (-2.73) (0.77) (-0.65) 
    
Equity -0.118*** -0.00480 -0.0104 
 (-3.75) (-0.16) (-0.33) 
    
Trust -0.00448 -0.00896 0.00202 
 (-0.44) (-0.77) (0.18) 
    
Time FE YES YES YES 
    
Country FE YES YES YES 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
    
Constant 0.155** 0.166** -0.000262 
 (2.41) (1.97) (-0.00) 
N 
Adj. R2 
2215 
0.166 
2234 
0.176 
2440 
0.184 
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Table 8: Effect of D_afterdeal_taxavoidt-1 variable on tax avoidance measures (Hypothesis 3) 
 
Notes: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡, in which the same controls 
from equation (1) are used for all the equations. 
The dependent variables are the 3 measures of tax avoidance, from equation (1) to (3), in which: BETR represents 
the book effective tax rate, CETR is the cash effective tax rate and CONFTAX is a measure of conforming tax 
avoidance. Firm characteristic variables were included as control variables. Fixed effects for year, country and 
industry were included in all equations. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, with t statistics in 
parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BETR CETR CONFTAX 
D_afterdeal -0.00612 -0.00302 0.00748 
 (-0.83) (-0.38) (1.04) 
    
D_afterdeal_taxavoidt.1 -0.0337 -0.0275 -0.0267 
 (-1.20) (-0.79) (-0.99) 
    
Ltotalassets 0.00144 0.00479** 0.00590*** 
 (0.66) (2.10) (2.84) 
    
Capex 0.151* -0.324*** -0.138 
 (1.66) (-2.92) (-1.46) 
    
Intangible 0.0878*** 0.0912*** 0.0515 
 (3.04) (2.73) (1.64) 
    
Inventories 0.0791* 0.0221 0.163*** 
 (1.77) (0.47) (2.79) 
    
Accruals -0.0476 0.115*** 0.528*** 
 (-0.84) (2.78) (3.74) 
    
ROA -0.874*** -0.972*** -0.0973* 
 (-9.08) (-10.98) (-1.65) 
    
PPE 0.000328 -0.0367 -0.0941*** 
 (0.01) (-1.04) (-3.45) 
    
Leverage -0.0947*** 0.0283 -0.0217 
 (-2.63) (0.74) (-0.64) 
    
Equity -0.114*** -0.00586 -0.00986 
 (-3.64) (-0.20) (-0.31) 
    
Trust -0.00521 -0.00877 0.00206 
 (-0.51) (-0.75) (0.18) 
    
Time FE YES YES YES 
    
Country FE YES YES YES 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
    
Constant 0.168*** 0.162* -0.000657 
 (2.61) (1.92) (-0.01) 
N 
Adj. R2 
2215 
0.164 
2234 
0.176 
2440 
0.184 
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Table 9: Effect of D_afterdeal_loss variable on tax avoidance measures (Hypothesis 4) 
 
Notes: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡, in which the same controls from 
equation (1) are used for all the equations. 
The dependent variables are the 3 measures of tax avoidance, from equation (1) to (3), in which: BETR represents 
the book effective tax rate, CETR is the cash effective tax rate and CONFTAX is a measure of conforming tax 
avoidance. Firm characteristic variables were included as control variables. Fixed effects for year, country and 
industry were included in all equations. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, with t statistics in 
parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BETR CETR CONFTAX 
D_afterdeal -0.00565 -0.00322 0.00769 
 (-0.77) (-0.41) (1.08) 
    
D_afterdeal_loss -0.0864*** -0.0242 -0.0622* 
 (-2.93) (-0.57) (-1.88) 
    
Ltotalassets 0.00140 0.00474** 0.00581*** 
 (0.64) (2.08) (2.80) 
    
Capex 0.156* -0.326*** -0.135 
 (1.73) (-2.94) (-1.43) 
    
Intangible 0.0881*** 0.0914*** 0.0525* 
 (3.05) (2.73) (1.67) 
    
Inventories 0.0794* 0.0216 0.162*** 
 (1.77) (0.46) (2.78) 
    
Accruals -0.0494 0.115*** 0.527*** 
 (-0.86) (2.78) (3.74) 
    
ROA -0.880*** -0.973*** -0.0985* 
 (-9.12) (-10.96) (-1.67) 
    
PPE -0.00102 -0.0376 -0.0945*** 
 (-0.04) (-1.07) (-3.46) 
    
Leverage -0.0957*** 0.0281 -0.0231 
 (-2.66) (0.74) (-0.69) 
    
Equity -0.112*** -0.00524 -0.00925 
 (-3.56) (-0.18) (-0.29) 
    
Trust -0.00479 -0.00871 0.00182 
 (-0.47) (-0.74) (0.16) 
    
Time FE YES YES YES 
    
Country FE YES YES YES 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
    
Constant 0.168*** 0.163* 0.00125 
 (2.62) (1.93) (0.02) 
N 
Adj. R2 
2215 
0.165 
2234 
0.176 
2440 
0.185 
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Table 10: Effect of D_afterdeal_domest variable on tax avoidance measures (Hypothesis 5) 
 
Notes: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑡, in which the same controls 
from equation (1) are used for all the equations. 
The dependent variables are the 3 measures of tax avoidance, from equation (1) to (3), in which: BETR represents 
the book effective tax rate, CETR is the cash effective tax rate and CONFTAX is a measure of conforming tax 
avoidance. Firm characteristic variables were included as control variables. Fixed effects for year, country and 
industry were included in all equations. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, with t statistics in 
parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BETR CETR CONFTAX 
D_afterdeal 0.0287** -0.00498 -0.00708 
 (2.27) (-0.44) (-0.67) 
    
D_afterdeal_domest -0.0506*** 0.00200 0.0199* 
 (-3.80) (0.16) (1.66) 
    
Ltotalassets 0.000359 0.00483** 0.00653*** 
 (0.16) (2.10) (3.07) 
    
Capex 0.171* -0.326*** -0.145 
 (1.92) (-2.94) (-1.54) 
    
Intangible 0.0713** 0.0920*** 0.0570* 
 (2.46) (2.74) (1.79) 
    
Inventories 0.0640 0.0223 0.170*** 
 (1.41) (0.47) (2.89) 
    
Accruals -0.0520 0.115*** 0.529*** 
 (-0.92) (2.78) (3.76) 
    
ROA -0.843*** -0.972*** -0.101* 
 (-8.82) (-10.90) (-1.71) 
    
PPE -0.00271 -0.0368 -0.0922*** 
 (-0.09) (-1.05) (-3.40) 
    
Leverage -0.102*** 0.0283 -0.0199 
 (-2.81) (0.74) (-0.59) 
    
Equity -0.115*** -0.00605 -0.0116 
 (-3.65) (-0.21) (-0.37) 
    
Trust -0.00437 -0.00880 0.00161 
 (-0.43) (-0.75) (0.14) 
    
Time FE YES YES YES 
    
Country FE YES YES YES 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
    
Constant 0.203*** 0.161* -0.0164 
 (3.13) (1.90) (-0.21) 
N 
Adj. R2 
2215 
0.170 
2234 
0.176 
2440 
0.185 
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Table 11: Effect of D_afterdeal_indust_loss variable on tax avoidance measures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑥𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + ℰ𝑥𝑖𝑧𝑐𝑡, in which the same 
controls from equation (1) are used for all the equations. 
The dependent variables are the 3 measures of tax avoidance, from equation (1) to (3), in which: BETR represents 
the book effective tax rate, CETR is the cash effective tax rate and CONFTAX is a measure of conforming tax 
avoidance. Firm characteristic variables were included as control variables. Fixed effects for year, country and 
industry were included in all equations. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, with t statistics in 
parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BETR CETR CONFTAX 
D_afterdeal -0.00603 -0.00334 0.00727 
 (-0.83) (-0.42) (1.02) 
    
D_afterdeal_indust_loss -0.0901** -0.0231 -0.0531 
 (-2.32) (-0.45) (-1.34) 
    
Ltotalassets 0.00147 0.00476** 0.00588*** 
 (0.67) (2.09) (2.83) 
    
Capex 0.154* -0.327*** -0.137 
 (1.71) (-2.94) (-1.45) 
    
Intangible 0.0884*** 0.0915*** 0.0527* 
 (3.06) (2.73) (1.68) 
    
Inventories 0.0805* 0.0219 0.163*** 
 (1.80) (0.46) (2.79) 
    
Accruals -0.0475 0.115*** 0.528*** 
 (-0.84) (2.79) (3.74) 
    
ROA -0.878*** -0.972*** -0.0987* 
 (-9.11) (-10.96) (-1.67) 
    
PPE -0.0000940 -0.0373 -0.0942*** 
 (-0.00) (-1.06) (-3.45) 
    
Leverage -0.0960*** 0.0279 -0.0232 
 (-2.67) (0.73) (-0.69) 
    
Equity -0.113*** -0.00561 -0.0101 
 (-3.61) (-0.19) (-0.32) 
    
Trust -0.00480 -0.00872 0.00174 
 (-0.47) (-0.74) (0.15) 
    
Time FE YES YES YES 
    
Country FE YES YES YES 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
    
Constant 0.166*** 0.162* 0.000231 
 (2.58) (1.92) (0.00) 
N 
Adj. R2 
2215 
SDSD 
2234 
SDSD 
2440 
SDS 
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Table 12: Effect of D_afterdeal on tax avoidance measures (H1) - Robustness analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑥𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + CONTROLS + 𝜃1𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇 + 𝜃2𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝐶 +
𝜃3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝜃4𝑅&𝐷 + ∑ 𝜑𝑧
27
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡
10
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑐
33
𝑐=1 + ℰ𝑥𝑖𝑧𝑐𝑡 .  
The dependent variables are the 3 measures of tax avoidance, from equation (1) to (3), in which: BETR 
represents the book effective tax rate, CETR is the cash effective tax rate and CONFTAX is a measure of 
conforming tax avoidance. Firm characteristic variables were included as control variables. Fixed effects 
for year, country and industry were included in all equations. Four country-level variables were added: 
Anti-trust measures the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy; Macroeconomic measures the quality of 
macroeconomic environment; Accounting measures the strength of auditing and reporting standards; R&D 
measures the company spending in R&D. All country-level variables were taken from Global 
Competitiveness Report. No data for 2005 is available due to methodology changes (World Economic 
Forum). Control variables were omitted. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, with t statistics 
in parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 BETR CETR CONFTAX 
D_afterdeal -0.00803 -0.00515 0.00658 
 (-1.08) (-0.65) (0.92) 
    
Country-level variables    
    
    
Trust -0.00263 0.00616 0.0270* 
 (-0.21) (0.44) (1.93) 
    
Anti-trust -0.0176 -0.0570** -0.101*** 
 (-0.74) (-2.44) (-4.51) 
    
Macroeconomic 0.00226 -0.00714 -0.00842 
 (0.32) (-0.91) (-1.06) 
    
Accounting -0.000949 -0.0148 0.0189 
 (-0.04) (-0.62) (0.82) 
    
R&D 0.0345 0.0344 0.0600** 
 (1.16) (1.09) (2.03) 
    
Other Controls (output omitted)    
    
Time FE YES YES YES 
    
Country FE YES YES YES 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
    
Constant 0.1000 0.377** 0.103 
 (0.58) (2.03) (0.57) 
N 
Adj. R2 
2167 
0.161 
2183 
0.177 
2383 
0.193 
 52 
 
Table 13: Factorial analysis 
 
 
Notes: The three measures of tax avoidance were incorporated (BETR, CETR and CONFTAX) into one single factor, from equation (1) to (6). Factor represents the combination of the 
three tax avoidance measures.  Fixed effects for year, country and industry included in all equations. Control variables were omitted. Robust standard errors were used in all equations, 
with t statistics in parentheses, and the *, ** and *** symbols representing the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor 
D_afterdeal 0.00545 0.108 0.0143 0.0149 0.132 0.0117 
 (0.09) (1.09) (0.22) (0.23) (1.39) (0.18) 
       
D_aftedeal_indust  -0.149     
  (-1.38)     
       
D_aftedeal_betrt-1   -0.359    
   (-1.55)    
       
D_aftedeal_loss    -0.675**   
    (-2.08)   
       
D_aftedeal_domest     -0.178*  
     (-1.69)  
       
D_aftedeal_indust_loss      -0.764* 
      (-1.95) 
       
Controls (output omitted)       
       
Time FE           YES           YES           YES          YES          YES            YES  
       
Country FE           YES           YES           YES          YES          YES            YES  
       
Industry FE           YES           YES           YES          YES          YES            YES  
       
Constant -0.181 -0.142 -0.154 -0.171 -0.101 -0.193 
 (-0.28) (-0.22) (-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.16) (-0.30) 
N 
Adj. R2 
1796 
0.174 
1796 
0.175 
1796 
0.175 
1796 
0.176 
1796 
0.175 
1796 
0.175 
